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humans. These advancements must cause us to reconsider our previous understanding of how people come to
know how to do a particular task. In order to unpack this question, I will first look to an account of knowing
how presented by Jason Stanley in his book Know How. I will then look towards criticisms of this view before
using evidence presented by the existence of Artificial Neural Networks to present a new view that addresses
the problems present in Stanley’s work. Finally, I will argue that knowing how to do something is a matter of
heuristics, or knowing certain shortcuts which approximate a solution to the task one is trying to accomplish.
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Knowing How: A Computational Approach 
 Certain aspects of human knowledge have always been of great interest to 
epistemologists. There are certain things that humans almost certainly know and can only be 
called knowing, but which seems to defy all traditional forms of defining knowledge. One such 
form of knowledge is the way in which humans appear to know how to do complex physical 
tasks with little to no cognitive thought. For the sake of speaking on a field which I myself 
understand, consider a fencer.  
When an experienced fencer is participating in a bout, while the fencer may be thinking 
in terms of general strategy and deciding when and where to attack, the attacks and defenses are 
almost automatic. Compare this to a new fencer, whose movements will be stiff and awkward as 
they are forced to think through their actions and their natural reaction to being attacked may 
actually be detrimental to them. The experienced fencer seems to possess a much greater degree 
of knowledge of how to fence, but this knowledge is not apparent by looking simply to cognitive 
action. This demonstrates the difference (or at least apparent difference) between two different 
forms of knowledge. Those forms are knowing that, and knowing how. 
Knowing that refers to knowing something in a propositional or true way. This is often 
defined as justified, true belief, and takes the form X knows p. These are factual statements about 
the world that can be proven true, or false, and tell us information about the world and what a 
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single person knows. Though this definition has been up for debate and has some clear flaws, it 
will not be the focus of this paper. 
Knowing how is a far more complex problem. Knowing how refers not to some 
proposition that expresses truth about the world, but rather knowledge about how to take some 
action. This action can be as simple as ringing a doorbell, or as complex as playing a sport at a 
professional level. At first glance, this seems to be very different from knowing that, but there is 
debate to this point. Intellectualists argue that while knowing how appears to be different, 
knowing how can be accurately and completely explained in terms of knowing that. 
For this paper, I will be assessing the Intellectualist argument and then looking at 
counter-arguments to that position. I will then be using my background in Computer Science, as 
well as looking at advances in Artificial Intelligence (or AI) to show how, with some slight 
definitional changes, artificial neural networks help demonstrate that knowing how can be 
reduced to knowing that through the use of heuristics. 
We will first approach one of the stronger arguments for the Intellectualists as made by 
Jason Stanley in his book Know How. The book covers in great detail the various aspects of what 
knowing how exactly entails. In the 5th chapter, Stanley outlines exactly what knowing how 
entails.  
“Knowing how to do something is a kind of knowledge-wh, a relation to a question. It is 
also a first-person mental state… It is time to add the remaining elements of of the 
analysis of the practical knowledge. These two remaining elements are the modality 
associated with infinitival embedded questions, and the distinctive mention-some reading 
of infinitival questions” (Stanley 111). 
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We will look at each of these aspects of knowing how individually to understand how Stanley 
wants to construct knowing how and how this construction supports the Intellectualist approach 
to knowing how. 
 The first aspect of knowing how, according to Stanley, is knowledge-wh. This has to do 
with the idea that statements of fact usually take the form X knows that p. However, there are 
statements that exist that do not fit into this model. For example, take some of the example 
statements from the book such as, “Hannah knows how to vote” and “Hannah knows who 
Obama is” (Stanley 36). These are statements which imply questions which an agent knows the 
answer to. In other words, these are statements of fact that can most simply be stated as knowing 
the answer to a given question. This is a fairly simple, but essential part of knowing how 
statements. 
 The next aspect we must cover is the idea that knowing how involves a first-person mind 
state. This aspect of knowing how actually involves several different aspects to be covered in 
turn, starting with the idea that a statement that expresses knowing how to do something will 
contain an infinitive clause, rather than a finite clause. This means that these statements take the 
following form. “For every s and F, s knows how to F iff for some way of F-ing, s knows that w 
is a way to F” (Stanley 71). Note here that this way of formulating knowing how demonstrates a 
way of understanding knowing how that can be formulated into a propositional statement. This is 
actually the most important point in this entire theory for the arguments I will be making later. 
 Stanley then goes into great detail describing two linguistic elements referred to as PRO, 
which is an unpronounced pronoun, and de se attitudes, or attitudes about oneself. These two 
elements are part of infinitival statements and therefore, are parts of any statements about 
knowing how. These two aspects of infinitival statements, for Stanley, point towards the idea 
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that statements about knowing how are in reference to opinions about oneself. In other words, 
when we we know how to do something, we know that we know a way to do something. This 
excludes knowing of ways that other people may do that act. When we talk of knowing how to 
do something, we are talking about knowing a way in which we do something. 
 The last pieces of the puzzle that is knowing how are both covered in the fifth chapter of 
Know How. The first piece is the presence of modalities in infinitival statements. What this is 
referring to is the idea that knowing how statements often have modalities embedded within the 
sentence that are not explicitly stated. An example from the book is the two statements, “John 
knows how to solve the problem” and “John knows how he could solve the problem” (Stanley 
113). These two statements are basically equivalent and show that when a person is expressing a 
know how statement, they are expressing some modality as well. The model above is the 
“ability” model and it deals with those statements which have an embedded “can”. However, it is 
possible for knowing how statements to also have an embedded “ought” within them and take a 
deontic form. This tends to be the exception rather than the rule, and is dependent on the context 
of the statement.  
 The last important aspect of knowing how statements is that they seem to have, rather 
than a mention-all reading, a mention-some reading. To simplify this, this means that a knowing 
how statement is saying that a person simply knows a way of how to do something, rather than 
all ways of doing something. However, this approach is slightly problematic. You have to know 
how to separate those mention-all statements, and those mention-some statements. The answer is 
that mention-some statements have a limited domain, or number of cases where a judgement can 
be made. This are based on context surrounding a situation. For example, when we talk about a 
child knowing how to write, we hold them to a lower standard than a college educated adult. 
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How we are to construe these domains is complicated and will be discussed in greater detail 
later. 
 With these aspects of knowing how statements, we can start to unpack an idea of how to 
reduce these knowing how statements to knowing that statements. First, we must combine these 
various aspects of knowing how into one definition. One is helpfully given directly by Stanley.  
“Relative to a context in which the domain is the set of normal ways of of doing things 
with which John is acquainted, a sentence like ‘John knows how to swim’ is true at world 
w if and only if John knows at w a proposition true in a world w΄ if and only if there is 
some way in which John could swim in w΄ with which John is acquainted and that way is 
also a way John is acquainted with by means of which John could swim in w” (Stanley 
122). 
Stated more simply, this is the idea that John knows a way to swim that is both consistent with 
the world that exists, and the world that John is aware of existing. By this definition, John has 
propositional knowledge of a way to swim, which while not explicitly stated, is necessarily 
propositional knowledge. This explains exactly how Stanley builds his system to support his 
assertion that knowing how can be reduced to knowing that. However, this theory is not without 
its own weaknesses.  
The first weakness of this theory is brought up in some form in a review of the work done 
by Kent Bach of San Francisco State that it does not give a robust explanation as to the 
difference between knowing how to do something, and being able to do that act. In the following 
passage, he explains how Stanley would reply to this objection. 
“Presumably a necessary condition for this success is that the agent have the resources 
(physical wherewithal, tools, materials, etc.), opportunity, and motivation (I'll call this the 
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"ROM" for short), but knowing-how does not require actually being able to succeed in 
performing the action, since one might not actually have the ROM. So, we might say, 
knowing how to do something is the cognitive component of the ability to do it. However 
this knowledge gets put to work, it would help explain one's success if one were to try to 
perform the action when the ROM condition is met. But it is not clear that the 
counterfactual success condition is necessary, since one can know how to do something 
one has the ROM to do even though one may not succeed, as when shooting a free throw, 
or is even likely to fail, as when taking a three-point shot” (Bach 12). 
He goes on to further discuss this point, but I raise my own objections to this defense. It makes 
some sense that a person may know how to do something in one context, but with slightly 
different factors surrounding the situation, a person may be unable to perform a given action. 
This however, seems to introduce the potential issue that knowing how to do something applies 
only to a given situation with specific parameters, which it can be argued would not be sufficient 
knowledge to accomplish that same task in the future. If a person only knows how to perform a 
task in a very specific scenario, can that be called knowledge how in a meaningful way. I would 
argue that without a robust explanation of why we can fail to accomplish something we know 
how to do, the explanation is insufficient. The explanation given, while introducing the idea of 
context, does not give enough information as to what that context is and what context is 
important. 
The second issue I take with this is that from a pragmatic viewpoint, this theory does not 
benefit us in understanding some of the underlying issues regarding know how. Stanley admits in 
his paper that it is difficult, if not impossible to know how to do something well without 
practicing the thing in question.  
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“Stanley briefly discusses the relationship between knowledge, ability, and practice. 
Consider the difference between knowing how to perform an action fluidly and merely 
knowing how to perform it cumbersomely. Suppose, for example, that you know how to 
touch-type but want to do it with more speed and fewer errors. So you practice and get 
better. Stanley suggests that the benefit of practice is not to give you new knowledge but 
to enable you to apply your prior knowledge directly, without having "to engage in a 
distinct action of consulting the propositional knowledge" (p. 184). Practice yields so-
called "muscle memory," as when you develop a "feel" for punching in your ATM 
number without having to think about how. You have the pattern of finger movements 
down pat but haven't learned anything new” (Bach 24). 
This is important to the field of Computer Science, in which programming a computer to do 
these tasks that simply seem to require practice is incredibly difficult. This makes the definition 
given to us by Stanley, while well stated, not compelling enough to provoke any action or further 
understanding. 
 These two issues are the ones that I wish to solve by approaching this problem through 
the lense of modern computing, specifically Artificial Intelligence. Advances in Artificial 
Intelligence (or AI) have been somewhat common of late due to a couple of important advances 
and discoveries. The first way in which AI has been helped by modern computing is by the fact 
that our ability to create more powerful computers is growing at a seemingly exponential rate. 
While there are still some serious memory and power limitations, they are far less severe than 
they used to be. The second major advancement has to do with the creation of Artificial Neural 
Networks (or ANNs). ANNs have allowed AI to be programmed with learning algorithms that 
allow an AI to adapt its own code to better deal with a given problem. To explain how this helps 
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the Intellectualist argument in regard to knowing how, we must first look at how exactly a ANN 
is built and functions. 
 In order to keep this explanation fairly simply, I will be using an article written for 
Medium.com by an employee of the company Josh.ai who goes only by the name Aaron. This is 
a fairly simple article, but it will provide enough of an overview to suit my purposes. The most 
important thing to cover is describing how these ANNs work.  
The answer is that we need to essentially ask them a large amount of questions, and 
provide them with answers. This is a field called supervised learning. With enough 
examples of question-answer pairs, the calculations and values stored at each neuron and 
synapse are slowly adjusted (Aaron 6). 
Essentially, an AI is given a question, attempts an answer, and then is judged on its answer. If it 
got the correct answer, or a preferable outcome, it adjusts accordingly, and a similar thing 
happens if it gets a question wrong. Basically, it takes the questions given and tunes itself to 
answer the questions given as accurately as possible in the future. This can be done either 
through direct observation where a human agent trains an AI’s responses, or through a self-
learning mechanism where an AI can run simulations and judge the outcomes entirely 
independent of a human overseer. 
 This approach to AI was created to mimic the manner in which humans learn in order to 
help create computers that could solve problems that are difficult to solve using normal 
algorithmic methods. This has to do with the way that neural networks operate as compared to 
usual problem solving methods. 
 When we make a program to play a game such as Chess, we normally solve this problem 
in an algorithmic way. In this way, the computer looks at the current board state, calculates as 
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many future board states as it can handle, and moves to create the board state that gives it the 
greatest chance for success based on the board states left available to the computer. In essence, 
the computer calculates all possible moves and picks the one that gives it the greatest chance of 
success considering all, or some, possible future moves. This is what I will call an algorithmic 
solution to the problem. This is incredibly useful in those circumstances where there are a limited 
number of configurations for a problem, or there is a problem that can be solved the same way 
regardless of the problems configuration. 
 ANNs work very differently. Instead of working off of one solution that is coded into the 
computer from the beginning, ANNs operate based on what are called heuristics. They do not 
always find the optimal solution to the problem, in fact they almost never do, but they instead 
learn a set of rules based on previous experience that allow the AI to solve most situations. This 
means that any solution the AI will decide on is not based on a set of concrete rules that will 
necessarily lead to a solution, but will take the actions it deems most likely to solve the problem. 
This is a simplification of the issue, but it is accurate to how a ANN behaves. 
 With this in mind, we can move to discuss how this advancement in AI affects our 
understanding of knowing how to do something. These ANNs can be said, in some sense to 
know how to do a particular act. For example, Google and IBM have created AIs based on these 
ANNs which can play the game Go, and make medical diagnoses respectively. The two AIs 
being referred to are Google’s AlphaGo and IBM’s Watson. AlphaGo recently played a set of 5 
games of Go against one of the top ranked players and former world champion Lee Sedol, and 
won that series 4-1. This was unprecedented simply because Go was one of the last traditional 
board games that computers had yet to be able to compete at a high level in. In AlphaGo’s first 
real public performance, it not only won the majority of its matches, but seemed unbeatable in 
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several of the games. An article on the website Quartz covered the matches, and specified some 
of the specific strange but brilliant moves made by AlphaGo. Here is one such move. “The fourth 
line from each edge of the board is known as ‘the line of influence,’ and it’s so important to the 
game that most boards mark it with dots. Young players are taught to play along the line of 
influence if they are after territory in the middle of the board. But AlphaGo, playing in black, 
played on the fifth line, which is generally thought to tilt the balance in favor of an opponent” 
(Wong and Sonnad). This move ended up helping AlphaGo secure the win. Even though this 
move is not a traditional move, based on the results of the game, I think it is fair to say that, if we 
do not take any arguments about mental states into account, that AlphaGo meets the 
requirements for knowing how to play Go. 
 How then does this help prove that knowledge how can be reduced to knowledge that? 
This argument is reliant on two points. First, the manner in which ANNs attempt to learn how to 
do an act is supposed to simulate the ways in which humans learn to act, and while the results are 
not the same as when we attempt to teach a human to do something and the scope of what ANNs 
can do is still relatively small, they do seem to be able to perform tasks normally thought to be 
only possible by humans sometimes better than any human agent. The second point I am relying 
on is the idea that no matter how complex a computer becomes, it is still simply code that can be 
copied and transferred to another system if we wish to do so. Essentially, as long as there is 
another computer that can handle the power requirements, any computer code can be copied and 
transferred to another computer and it would present no significant problems. 
 This leads me to my conclusion. Knowing how to do something can be reduced to a set of 
defined statements that take the form of heuristics rather than normal propositional statements. In 
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addition, I will argue that heuristics should be considered a form of knowing that because they 
do state a proposition that can be proved true or false. 
 The way in which a ANN operates means it is effectively using heuristics to get to its 
solution. It is not working with an algorithm that works every time, but looking at the context of 
a situation and picking the solution that is most likely to work. The same can be said of humans 
attempting to learn how to do a complex action, such as play a sport. We don’t learn the best way 
to do a certain act, we learn a number of mental shortcuts which get us to our destination more 
often than not. 
 This sufficiently explains why we fail to accomplish our goals even if we seemingly 
know what to do. Heuristics operate on the idea that they probably get us to our goal. That means 
that inevitably, we will fail. When we do so, we revise our worldview and then continue on. This 
means that even if you do know how to do something, failing isn’t inherently problematic for the 
Intellectualist position. 
 However, to make this argument, one would have to demonstrate that Heuristics can be 
seen as propositional statements. This is easy enough to do when you look at how these 
sentences can be broken down. Let’s look at the statement, “John knows how to swim”. What we 
need to do, if we take knowing how to be a heuristic, is break down what exactly “how to swim” 
entails. Stanley would break this statement down as “John knows a way to swim”, however I 
would take this statement one step further. I would say that “John knows a way to swim that 
usually works”. This statement can be broken down into sub-actions, but every single action 
within this set should carry some degree of uncertainty within it. 
 Note that while these statements do rely on probability, the statements themselves can be 
considered true or false. The uncertainty is only in the success of the action, and not in the truth 
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or falsity of the overall statement. This means that this statement can fit all the requirements 
necessary for propositional knowledge. 
 There is one weak point in this argument, however, which is regarding at what point we 
can consider a person to know how to do something. How often must a person succeed at a 
particular act before we can say that a person knows how to do something? If a person knows a 
way to do something that they are aware almost never works, can they be said to know how to do 
something? I would argue that a person needs to be able to do something beyond the degree of 
random attempts in order to be considered to have knowledge how. If a person cannot determine 
in what situations a method works, and that method works less than half the time, then a person 
cannot be said to know how to do something. However, any requirement I set can be attacked as 
arbitrary and I do not currently have the evidence to set a limit where I can refute such claims. 
As a result, this argument exists in a somewhat incomplete fashion. 
 However, I would still defend this idea as important in revealing something important 
about the nature of knowing how to do something. We are living in an age where the existence of 
computers can help to reveal a great many mysteries present in the world around us. The 
emergence of ANNs has given us substantial insight into the process of learning in general and 
we should not discount the information being presented to us. We are starting to know how 
learning takes place and we as humans should jump at the chance to demystify our 
understandings of ourselves. ANNs are helping not only to solve problems present in the world 
outside, but also to provide us better understanding of who we are as people. 
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